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Introduction
The search for positive productivity effects (commonly termed "spillovers") from multinational companies to host country firms has attracted considerable interest in the academic literature. While the earlier literature looked specifically for within-industry "horizontal spillovers", the consensus is now that much stronger effects should be expected from vertical and in particular backward linkages between multinationals and their local suppliers.
1 Somewhat inspired by these empirical findings, many countries have attracted actively foreign direct investment (FDI) with fiscal incentives, hoping that in return indigenous suppliers will learn through their business relationship with multinational customers.
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While the available empirical literature produces encouraging results, it suffers from one main conceptual shortcoming. The traditional backward spillovers studies, such as Javorcik (2004) , measure linkages between multinationals and domestic firms only at the industry level. Specifically, productivity in domestic firms is linked to a measure of the importance of multinationals in downstream industries, calculated using aggregate inputoutput tables. This does not allow the researcher to identify the exact channels through which domestic firms in upstream industries are expected to benefit -is it a supplier effect, a competition effect, or something else entirely? 3 Javorcik and Spatareanu (2009) and Gorodnichenko et al. (2007) are among the first to confront this limitation. Javorcik and Spatareanu (2009) use firm level data for the 2 Czech Republic, including information on whether a domestic firm is a supplier to a multinational. They show that suppliers are indeed more productive than non-suppliers. Gorodnichenko et al. (2007) use data for 17 Eastern European and Central Asian countries.
They exploit firm level information on the share of output supplied by domestic firms to multinationals and find that a higher share is correlated with higher productivity growth.
These papers, however, are silent on the actual mechanism that is at work and that causes productivity to increase. We, therefore, expand on these papers by examining one potential mechanism through which suppliers may improve their productivity. We refer to this as a "forced linkage effect".
While many authors interpret the above results as suggesting that there is learning from multinationals, whereby multinationals voluntarily share knowledge and cooperate with their suppliers (backed up by some case study evidence, such as Moran, 2001 ), this may be a somewhat overly benevolent view of how multinationals manage their suppliers in emerging economies. An alternative interpretation is that multinationals force their customers to adopt new practices -and may punish if these are not implemented to their satisfaction. Blomström and Kokko (1998) , also based on case study evidence, point out that such "forced linkage effects" may be an important mechanism through which domestic suppliers can improve their performance.
To our knowledge, no one has explored empirically the existence of such a "forced linkage" mechanism thus far. This paper attempts to fill this gap in the literature. We investigate empirically whether this is an important channel through which multinationals increase the productivity of their suppliers. In order to do so, we use a rich source of firm level data for emerging market economies in Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia.
This data comes from the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) provided jointly by the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). We use the 2005 survey, complemented with some information 3 from the 2002 survey. Our dataset provides unique information, at the firm level, on whether a firm supplies multinationals (and how much) and also on whether a firm perceives to be subject to pressure from customers to reduce production costs or to create new products. The combination of these two variables is central to our measurement of the forced linkage effect.
What exactly do we mean by a "forced linkage effect"? We conceptualize this idea in the following way. First, multinationals require that their suppliers meet their higher standards on product features, delivery schedules, quality control, inventory holding and accommodate continuously their demanding business procedures. Second, such requirements have a potential productivity enhancing effect on host country suppliers because multinationals have gathered their own experience and best practices with similar products in their main country. Third, and this is the main difference from a mere cooperation effect, suppliers are forced by their multinational customers to meet those requirements. 4 Multinationals, due to their extensive experience with international production networks, are in a position to evaluate the performance of host country suppliers accurately. This enables them to "punish" local suppliers, e.g., through switching supplier sources or forcing price reductions, if the required standards are not met.
While the concept of a "forced linkage" is not firmly grounded in the existing theoretical literature, recent theoretical developments on imperfect contracts and bargaining may provide some guidance for a better understanding of frictions between customers and suppliers in general and the forced linkage effect in particular. In the "property rights"
view of the firm, as applied to international sourcing decisions by, e.g. Antràs (2003) and Antràs and Helpman (2004, 2008) , a final good producer and its one supplier are engaged in generalized Nash bargaining on the total surplus generated from the relationship. In this set up, one interpretation of "pressure" from the customer is that it shifts the bargaining 4 weight in favor of the customer. Normally, we would expect that this would reduce the incentives for the independent supplier and thus lead to an underinvestment in terms of effort, i.e. lower productivity for the supplier.
However, the situation of a multinational company and its supplier is likely to be somewhat different than assumed in this stylized model. Firstly, the multinational has access to superior technology, which it may transfer to the supplier. This may either be done voluntarily, or it may come with pressure to fulfill some tough requirements or else be punished. The latter would correspond to our notion of a "forced linkage". In our empirical analysis, we attempt to distinguish the simple technology transfer effect from a forced linkage effect. Another important difference from the theoretical model is that it is unlikely to be the case that one supplier exclusively supplies one multinational firm.
Rather, independent suppliers have the option of working for additional customers. 5 In this case, the benefits of responding to pressure by multinationals might have additional positive effects for the output sold to other firms. These two aspects are likely to overcome the disincentive to provide effort when pressured by the customer, and provide higher overall productivity gains when supplying pressuring multinationals.
Our paper is, to the best of our knowledge, the first to investigate whether knowledge is transferred through a forced linkage or through a more cooperative channel.
Thereby we add to the existing studies on productivity spillovers from multinational companies, providing one further step towards understanding the mechanisms at work.
Indeed, the existence of a forced linkage effect might help explain an ambivalence often found in surveys on suppliers of multinationals: they complain occasionally about their 5 Grossman and Helpman (2002) allow the produced good to be valuable for other producers on a secondary market in cases in which the bargaining breaks down. This offers a positive outside option for the supplier at the bargaining stage. Note that the commitment given by the multinational to keep the supplier as a separate legal entity (i.e., not to "integrate" the supplier) is that the customer gives up a valuable outside option at the bargaining stage (see Antras and Helpman, 2004) . In Grossman and Helpman (2004) a customer can give its supplier a higher stake in the relationship when he cannot monitor its independent supplier. While this creates incentive for the supplier to provide more effort, it might also as well bind the supplier to this specific customer when the supplier uses its option to serve other customers.
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multinational clients but at the same time they are eager to develop or extend business relationships with multinationals. 6 The forced linkage effect highlights a possibly more frictional customer-supplier relationship than one in which multinationals share their proprietary knowledge freely.
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The paper by Gorodnichenko et al. (2007) is closest to us as it also uses data from the 2005 BEEPS survey and uses information on supplies to multinationals at the firm level. However, they do not consider the "forced linkage" as a channel through which productivity may be boosted in local suppliers but only ask whether suppliers experience higher productivity growth. As we show below, it is however crucially important to distinguish the effect of supplying to multinationals for firms that experience "pressure from their customers" from those that do not. Furthermore, the identification of a causal effect from supplier status to productivity growth is difficult in the Gorodnichenko et al. to be more confident about identification of an effect of the supplier status of the firm on productivity growth. We also combine our approach with an explicit test for exogeneity, using instrumental variables available in the BEEPS data. 8 , 9
6 Javorcik (2008) shows using a survey on Czech suppliers of multinationals that 37.5 percent of multinationals mandatory scheduled regular price cuts to their suppliers which might lead to complaints from suppliers. She also shows that more than 35 percent of suppliers report to undertake improvements to satisfy their multinational clients. 7 This does not contradict the findings that suppliers might on some occasions receive some effective assistance from their multinational clients as, for example, illustrated by Liker and Choi (2004) . 8 Another difference is that Gorodnichenko et al. (2007) In section 2 we develop our empirical strategy, while section 3 discusses the data used and presents summary statistics. The econometric analysis is presented in Section 4.
Section 5 provides some concluding comments.
Empirical framework
In our empirical analysis we investigate whether there are positive productivity effects from supplying multinationals, and whether these may be due to a "forced linkage".
In order to do so we examine the relationship between productivity growth of a host country firm and its status of whether it is a supplier to a multinational.
More specifically, we estimate the determinants of productivity growth using an augmented Cobb-Douglas production function, which in its most basic form looks as
(1) estimated effects we opt for the latter. Reassuringly, Gorodnichenko et al. (2007) as well as the companion paper Gorodnichenko et al. (2010) both compare the cross-section results with the smaller set of panel results. They do not find any major differences in results, apart from the fact that coefficients appear less statistically significant in the panel. Hence, if anything, it is likely that we would underestimate any effects. 10 The production function estimation allows us to estimate the determinants of productivity growth, i.e., the variation in the change of output that is not explained by variations in the growth of inputs. The setup of a one-step production function has been used extensively for analysing the effect of foreign direct investment on productivity; see, for example, Javorcik (2004) . An alternative would be a two-step approach, were one retrieves TFP as the error term of a simple production function and in a second step regresses TFP on the spillover variables. We do not follow such an approach mainly for two reasons. Firstly, it is less efficient than the one step estimation. Second, while the two step approach allows the researcher to better deal with potential simultaneity in the production function (see Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003) we cannot implement such an approach due to data limitations.  is assumed to be white noise.
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The focus of our study is on whether being a supplier to a multinational firm matters for productivity growth. Following the arguments set out in the introduction, the expected sign for CUST i p is ambiguous. On the one hand, the underinvestment problem of the supplier becomes more severe when the balance of power is shifted in favor of the customer. In this case, "pressure" is likely to exacerbate the underinvestment problem, reduce the incentives for the supplier and thus lead to less effort, i.e. lower productivity for the supplier. 12 However if a supplier has more than one customer, pressure by one customer to reduce inefficiency may positively affect also output sold to other customers, thus leading to productivity growth.
The main variable of interest is our proxy for "forced linkages". One way pressure from competition might be related to higher supplier productivity is provided by Horn et al. (1995) . They analyze the design of optimal incentive contracts in an environment with international trade in which a principal cannot monitor the actions undertaken by its supplying agent. In their framework, openness to trade increases competition on product markets through a general equilibrium effect and contributes to higher levels of managerial effort provided by the supplier, and thus improved internal efficiency (i.e. reduced X-inefficiency). If "pressure by competitors to reduce production 13 Note that our data only allow us to calculate a variable indicating whether there is pressure from customers, not whether these pressuring customers are multinationals. We only know whether a firm is intensively pressured by customers and at the same time whether it has multinational firms as customers. It is unlikely that the average domestic customer in emerging economies has access to international best practices and the resulting accumulated knowledge that they could impose upon their suppliers. 14 The survey questions related to all variables are listed in Appendix 1.
costs" is a good proxy for how increased competition impact firms in this framework, then we would expect that high pressure from competitors is related to more managerial effort provided by the supplying agent and thus improved productivity. Note that a potential problem with estimating equation (1) using OLS is that we assume that the suppliers´ status is exogenous. This may be a problematic assumption, in particular because there may be self-selection of more productive firms as suppliers to multinationals (Javorcik and Spatareanu, 2008 [insert Table 1 here]
The survey's main aim is to allow for a cross country comparison of business activities and, to that end, asks each firm more than 80 questions about their business, the institutional environment and their perceptions about the business environment. The survey sample in each country is stratified by firm size, sector and region. Sector stratification is undertaken to reflect the relative contribution of each sector to the region's GDP.
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Great care has been taken to train and advise interviewers in order to minimize potential distortions and irregularities between countries or during each interview.
Interviews have been conducted face-to-face and anonymity has been guaranteed to all participants. Still, a typical concern when using survey data is that of individual perception 16 Unfortunately there is no panel structure linked to the BEEPS 1999 survey. 17 To be precise, stratification by sector depends on the size of the economy. Very small economies (less than $15bn GNI) are stratified into manufacturing and non-agricultural sector; small economies ($15bn to $100bn GNI) into manufacturing, retail, and rest of non-agricultural sector; medium economies ($100 to $500bn GNI) into five manufacturing sectors, retail and rest; large economies (more than $500bn GNI) into seven manufacturing sectors, retail and rest. This implies that for all economy sizes, the sample should be representative at least of total manufacturing and the non-agricultural economy. As the economy size increases, representativeness of other more narrowly defined sectors increases. Details of the sampling methodology are available at www.enterprisesurveys.org.
bias, since it is common that responses of firms based on surveys are likely to be prejudiced by the general perception of firms (Kaufman and Wei, 1999) . Some firms may consistently provide positive or negative answers depending on their general perception of the environment in which they currently operate. In principle, assuming that the bias is for each of the variables in brackets.
"Over the last 36 months how have [sales, fixed assets, material inputs] changed and what is the percent of change for your company, in real terms (i.e. after allowing for inflation)"
13 A similar question is asked for changes in employment over the same 36 months in each firm and described in Appendix 1. We use answers to these questions as a base for our productivity growth estimation in equation (1). Such data enable us to construct a simple Cobb Douglas production function. We acknowledge that there is a potential simultaneity problem in input choices in the production function estimation, as described, for example, by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) . Unfortunately, we do not have sufficient data to implement the techniques suggested in their paper. However, this potential disadvantage has to be weighed against the advantages of having unique information on pressure from customers reported by their suppliers as well as detailed information on suppliers' sales to multinationals. Such information makes it possible, for the first time, to confront the forced linkages effect with a formal econometric analysis. find that these firms are more likely to report pressure from competitors than other suppliers. They are also firms that experience higher output growth in the subsequent periods. However, there is no obvious difference in the share of output sold to multinationals when comparing "pressured" and "non-pressured" suppliers.
[insert Table 2 here] In column (2) we turn to the estimation of equation (1) suppliers that experience pressure from their customers experience productivity growth that is about 11 percent higher than that of other firms.
Empirical results
Baseline model
We might ask whether our proxy for the forced linkage does not capture a mere competition effect through which suppliers of multinationals are forced to adopt their 20 Gorodnichenko et al. (2007) industry´s best practices because their domestic competitors apply such practices as well.
This could also result in a productivity enhancing effect, but not through the direct suppliercustomer relationship (Horn et al. 1995) . We consider this hypothesis by enlarging our baseline equation with a variable that considers "pressure from domestic competition to reduce production costs" is not merely driven by a general competition channel in our data. 21 Rather it gives further support that the benefit of the forced linkage effect and its coercive mechanism runs through the customer-supplier relationship.
In column (4), we enlarge our specification with qualitative variables closely related to a more cooperative mechanism that might channel productivity gains for suppliers because they sell their products to multinational firms. These variables are [insert Table 3 here]
In the above estimations, we defined the supplier status of a firm using a binary yes/no variable. However, we also have information on the share of output that is sold to a multinational. We use this information in the results reported in Table 4 . We re-estimate equation (1) but now using the share of output and its interaction as independent variables.
Results are much in line with the results in Table 3 . We find that the share of output sold to multinationals is only positively associated with productivity growth when it is accompanied by pressure from customers. This, hence, provides further support for our hypothesis of a forced linkage effect.
[insert Table 4 here]
Exogeneity of supplier status
Before we move on to some further robustness checks, we consider the assumption of exogeneity of the supplier status. This assumption would not hold if there were selfselection, whereby the most productive firms might self-select to become suppliers of multinationals (Javorcik and Spatareanu, 2008) . One way of alleviating this problem is our definition of the supplier status in the period before productivity growth is measured. Note also that our variable of most interest is the interaction of pressure from customers and the supplier status, not solely the supplier status. There is no reason to suspect that among suppliers of MNEs, those suppliers that exhibit higher pressure from their multinational customers experience it because they have higher productivity growth.
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Nevertheless, we also test explicitly for exogeneity using an instrumental variables approach. The BEEPS data provides us with a number of potential instruments. We employ two instruments for the supplier status (either dummy variable or the share of output supplied to multinationals) which are based on two questions in the 2002 survey.
The first is a dummy variable that indicates whether a firm ever had to resolve an overdue payment, the second a dummy indicating whether a firm is a member of a business association or chamber of commerce.
We consider the first to be a relevant instrument, as being a supplier necessarily implies the receipt of payment from the customer. However, there may be a difference in the speed and reliability of the payment depending on the nature of the customer. On the one hand, multinationals as opposed to domestic customers, may be more forthcoming with their payments as they are part of a large internationally operating enterprise which is likely to be a reliable debtor. On the other hand, a multinational is likely to be in a strong bargaining position and might optimise its timing of payment flows which could results in payment delays. In any case, the variable is likely to be correlated with the supplier status of a firm. There is, however, no reason to suppose that the receipt of an overdue payment is related to productivity growth of the firm.
The second instrument is also expected to be correlated with the supplier status as the membership of an association or chamber of commerce may make it easier for a local supplier to find customers. Again, however there is no reason to believe that such a membership may be more or less likely for firms with high vs low productivity growth. Table 5 presents the first stage regression coefficients for the excluded instruments as well as the diagnostic tests. We re-estimate the models presented in columns (2) in Table 3 (supplier dummy) and Table 4 (share of output), respectively, using an IV estimator. Column (1) in Table 5 assumes the supplier dummy to be endogenous, column (2) uses the share of output supplied to multinationals.
Note, firstly, that both instruments are individually significant in the regressions.
Given the way these variables are defined, the negative coefficients imply that a firm is more likely to be a supplier (or supply a larger proportion of output to a multinational) if the firm either had to resolve an overdue payment or is a member of a business organisation / chamber of commerce. The F-tests also suggest that the instruments are jointly relevant, and the F-statistics are above 10, the value generally considered to be high enough to reject the assumption of weak instruments (Staiger and Stock, 1997) . The underidentification tests also suggest that we do not suffer from a weak instrument problem. The Hansen J statistics furthermore suggest that our overidentification restrictions are valid, suggesting instrument validity.
Based on these instruments, we then test for the assumption of exogeneity of the two alternative measures of the supplier status in equation (1). We are not able to reject this assumption. Hence, we are confident that our estimations based on the assumption of exogeneity allow us to identify an effect of the supplier status on productivity growth of firms.
[insert Table 5 here] Table 6 presents the results of two further robustness checks. The first one, reported in columns (1) and (2) uses a slightly re-defined measure of pressure from customers.
Further robustness checks
Recall that in the estimations thus far this is measured as a dummy equal to one if the firm reports that pressure from customers is "very important". We now redefine this variable as equal to one if the firm answers "very important" or "fairly important" to this question.
This, of course, also implies that the interaction terms   
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The analysis thus far includes both domestic and foreign firms. From the perspective of a host country policy maker it may, however, be particularly important to know how domestic firms are impacted upon by their linkages with multinationals. In order to consider this explicitly, we dropped all foreign firms from our sample and reestimated equation (1) only for the sample of domestic firms. The results, which are very similar to those found in Tables 3 and 4 , are reported in columns (3) and (4) of table 6.
They support our hypothesis of a forced linkage effect in the customer-supplier relationship between multinationals and domestic firms.
[insert Table 6 here]
Conclusions
This paper presents the first empirical evidence of a forced linkage effect in the context of spillovers from FDI using a large sample of more than 1000 firms in 25 emerging economies. We find that productivity gains only materialize for suppliers of multinationals when they are pressured by their customers to reduce production costs or create new products. Suppliers of multinational firms appear to be forced by their multinational customers to adopt some tough demands on product features and business interaction procedures that have a positive productivity effect.
Such an effect of serving multinationals has largely been ignored by the recent literature on backward spillovers. We show that the forced linkage effect holds in various specifications, controlling for other factors that may impact the supplier-customer relationship.
This adds a new policy relevant angle to the spillovers literature. Most of the studies on spillovers through backward linkages at least implicitly, if not explicitly, seem to be based on the assumption of a benevolent multinational that is willing to share knowledge voluntarily and instruct willing suppliers. While our evidence does not indicate that this is 21 not the case, our results suggest that the customer-supplier relationship may not always be so harmonious. Multinationals' accumulated experience allows them to put pressure on their suppliers to improve production costs or create new products -which also turns out to be to the benefit of the supplier, in terms of increased productivity growth. Regression includes constant term and full sets of country and industry dummies Robust standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Regression includes constant term and full sets of country and industry dummies Robust standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Tables 3 and 4 , respectively. Instruments are (i) dummy whether a firm ever had to resolve an overdue payment, (ii) dummy whether a firm is a member of a business association or chamber of commerce Dummies defined as 1 = yes, 2 = no Robust standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
